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Abstract 
 
Research has shown that the memory characteristics questionnaire (MCQ) can be used to 
discriminate between 'memories' of perceived events and 'memories' of imagined events.  
The present study extended this research by examining the utility of the MCQ in 
distinguishing impossible memories (i.e. reports of an event a person could not have 
witnessed).  Congruent with previous research, a considerable number of participants in both 
the pilot study (45%) and the main study (44%) were willing to report that they had seen a 
non-existent film of the car crash in which Diana, Princess of Wales was killed.  The MCQ 
ratings of three groups of participants were therefore compared: (1) those who indicated that 
they had seen the non-existent film, (2) those who were asked to imagine having seen the 
film, and (3) a control group who were asked to rate their memory of when they first heard the 
news of the crash.  The MCQ did not serve to distinguish impossible memories, but there 
were reliable differences on one of the MCQ subscales between those who imagined the film 
and controls.  Furthermore, participants who reported that they had seen the film gave higher 
scores on the Self Monitoring scale.  Implications are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
The recent recovered/false memory controversy has focussed attention on the reliability or 
otherwise of reports of childhood trauma (Brandon et al., 1997; Conway, 1997; Lynn & 
McConkey, 1998; Pezdek & Banks, 1996; Williams & Banyard, 1999).  The consensus in the 
literature is that reports by adults of childhood trauma can either be 'true', 'false' or a mixture 
of both.  From a legal perspective it is important to know whether there are any reliable 
indicators of the veracity of such reports.  As Gold (1999, p. 8) has recently observed, 
“memory is the currency of the courts, it is what the courts deal in, but false memory is 
counterfeit currency … ”.  The question, at least in this context, is how are the counterfeits to 
be identified?  
 
Numerous research papers have demonstrated the utility of the reality monitoring model in 
discriminating between participants' self-reports of the quality of externally- and internally-
generated stimuli (Johnson, 1988; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Markham, 1991).  Typically, these 
studies find that participants' reports of externally generated events (e.g. 'real' events) contain 
more sensory information than, for example, reports of internally-generated events (e.g. 
'imagined' events or dreams) (Johnson, Kahan, & Raye, 1984; Johnson & Suengas, 1989).  
Recent research has adopted this model to examine whether reality monitoring can be used 
to distinguish a further group of reports: those which participants make about events that, as 
far as it is possible to ascertain were not witnessed, or did not occur at all (Porter, Yuille, & 
Lehman, 1999).  Porter et al. (1999) devised a procedure (the Memory Assessment 
Procedure, or MAP), based on the reality monitoring model, that may be an important first 
step in providing answers to these questions. 
 
The Memory Assessment Procedure (MAP) was developed from elements of the Memory 
Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ, Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye 1988), as well as 
elements from Statement Validity Analysis (Steller & Köhnken, 1990).  Using this new 
procedure, participants’ reports were rated using 12 factors (5 were rated by participants 
themselves and 7 were rated by independent coders) including vividness, confidence, 
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sensory components, amount of detail, repeated details and coherence.  Participants in the 
Porter et al. (1999) study were asked to provide, over three interviews, details of emotionally-
charged childhood events.  Participants were informed that their parents had provided the 
details of all of the events.  In fact, whilst some of the events were based on parental reports 
('real'), some of the events ('created') had been crafted by the investigators.  In the final 
interview participants were asked by another investigator to deliberately fabricate an 
investigator-provided childhood event.  The investigators then used the Memory Assessment 
Procedure (MAP) to investigate possible differences between the three ‘types’ of reported 
‘memories’ (real, created, and fabricated). 
 
Porter et al. (1999) found that participants' reports of real events were rated as more vivid and 
clear, detailed, moderately coherent, with participants willing to admit a lack of memory.  
Participants' reports of created events were rated as having good coherence, but were rated 
as less vivid, and were held with less confidence.  Deliberately fabricated reports were found 
to have an exaggerated ‘over-the-top’ quality, being reported as highly vivid and clear, with 
high stress ratings, and containing many repeated details. 
 
Of course, one of the problems with this paradigm is that it relies on parental reports of events 
that may not be particularly reliable.  Critics argue that the alleged false events reported by 
participants may just be distortions of events that did occur and therefore not objectively false 
(see Conte, 1999).  However, defenders of this paradigm argue that what is significant is that 
participants come to report the specific suggested details about the created events (Loftus, 
1997).  
 
Is it possible for participants to come to report that they have witnessed an entire event that 
they could not objectively have witnessed?  One study has examined 'memories' of an 
emotionally charged, real-life event that definitely could not have been perceived by 
participants.  Crombag, Wagenaar, and van Koppen (1996) examined participants’ reports of 
a film of a plane crashing into an apartment block in Amsterdam.  They distributed two 
questionnaires asking participants if they had seen on television a film of the moment when 
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the plane crashed into the apartment blocks, when in fact, no such film existed, although the 
crash did take place and was major news.  The first questionnaire simply asked whether 
participants had seen the film and, if so, where they had seen it and roughly how long it had 
taken for fire to break out once the plane had crashed.  They found that 55% of their 
participants reported having seen the film and most of these participants gave further details, 
including how long it took for fire to break out.  Only 18% of participants stated that they did 
not remember the film. 
 
Crombag et al. (1996) then distributed a second, modified questionnaire to another sample of 
participants.  This questionnaire asked whether participants had seen the film and, if so, 
asked for further specific details regarding events surrounding the crash (such as the angle 
that the plane hit the apartment buildings, how long it took before fire broke out, and the final 
resting place of the remains of the plane).  This time 66% of their participants stated that they 
had seen the film and gave further information, including the angle that the plane hit the 
building, at what point fire broke out, and the final resting position of the remains of the plane.  
These investigators suggested that the highly charged nature of the event and its publicity 
may have evoked particularly strong and vivid imagery which, in turn may have led the 
participants to make an erroneous source monitoring judgements and wrongly report that they 
had actually seen the film.  They also stated that female participants were more likely to 
report having seen the film than male participants were.   
 
The aim of the present study was to examine participants’ MCQ ratings of a perceived event, 
an imagined event, and an event that participants did not witness, but nevertheless claimed to 
have seen, to investigate whether there are any distinguishing characteristics of such reports.  
The present study also examined whether certain individual difference measures were 
correlated with false reporting.  Specifically, participants were asked to complete the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES, Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Wright & Loftus, in press), 
which has been found to be correlated with memory suggestibility (Hyman & Billings, 1998; 
Ost, Fellows & Bull, 1997; Porter et al., 1999).  Since Crombag et al. (1996) suggested that 
compliance (or eagerness to please) may have been responsible for their findings, the self 
 6 
monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974) was also administered.  High self-monitoring individuals are 
more likely to want to please others and therefore may be more likely to report that they have 
seen the non-existent film in order to please to experimenters and appear to be “good 
subjects”.  Unlike previous studies, the present study also included a five-item memory 
confidence scale, a high score on which indicated that participants believed that they 
generally had good memorial abilities (adapted from Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 
1982).  This was included to examine whether participants’ confidence in their own memory 
was a significant factor in deciding whether or not they had seen the target event.  In addition, 
the present study examined sex differences in MCQ ratings to examine if there was anything 
that might explain the sex effect found by Crombag et al. (1996).  The target event was the 
car crash in Paris in which Diana, the Princess of Wales, Dodi Fayed and their driver lost their 
lives. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the reality monitoring model, the first hypothesis was that ratings given by 
participants in the control condition about their memory of when they first heard the news of 
the crash would contain more sensory information and less evidence of cognitive operations 
than ratings given by participants who were asked to imagine seeing the film and those who 
claimed to actually have seen the film.  The second hypothesis predicted that participants 
who had claimed to have seen the film would give higher scores on the dissociative 
experiences scale (DES) and the self monitoring scale than participants in the imagine group.  
Based on Crombag et al.'s (1996) findings, we also explored sex differences in responses to 
the MCQ. 
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Method 
 
The target event 
 
The target event in this study was the car crash in Paris in which Princess Diana, Dodi Fayed 
and their driver were killed1.  As soon as the news had broken, virtually every television 
station in Britain broadcast a continual coverage of the events.  Therefore, it would be difficult 
to find a resident of the UK with access to a television that had not witnessed at least some of 
the coverage.  There was considerable controversy after the crash as to whether the 
paparazzi, who had allegedly been carrying video-cameras and who had been pursuing the 
car across Paris, had actually caught the moment of impact on film.  As far as it is possible to 
ascertain, no film of the actual crash exists, and if it does exist it has certainly never been 
shown on television.  Therefore, in order to replicate the Crombag et al. study as closely as 
possible (i.e. to question participants about a non-existent film), participants in the present 
study were given a questionnaire asking them if they had seen this video-recording of the car 
crash. 
 
Design 
 
The study investigated the MCQ ratings given by three groups of participants: firstly, 
participants who claimed to have seen the film and secondly, participants who indicated that 
they had not seen the film but were asked to imagine having seen the film.  In order to provide 
a control group, a third subgroup of participants, who had not been asked about the film, were 
simply asked to remember when they first heard the news of the crash.  All participants 
completed the dissociative experiences scale (DES, Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Wright & 
                                                          
1
  In order to select a suitable target event, two pilot questionnaires were distributed, concerning events that had not 
been televised and which participants could not have seen.  The first questionnaire asked participants whether they 
had seen the film of the Diana car crash and the second questionnaire asked participants whether they had seen the 
film of the Spencer family’s funeral for Diana (which in fact they could not possibly have seen).  A total of forty 
participants piloted these questionnaires (twenty different participants completed each pilot questionnaire).  
Participants were first asked to indicate whether they had seen the film and, if so, where they had seen it and also a 
few further details (e.g. those asked about the crash film were also asked roughly how many motorbikes were 
involved in the chase, and those asked about the funeral film were asked roughly how many people were present).   
Analysis of the pilot questionnaires indicated that 45% of the first pilot group of participants claimed to have seen the 
film of the car crash, whilst only 10% of the second pilot group claimed to have seen the film of the funeral.  The 
percentage of individuals who claimed to have seen the film of the car crash is similar to the initial percentage of 
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Loftus, in press), the self monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974), the five-item memory confidence 
scale (adapted from Broadbent et al., 1982), and the memory characteristics questionnaire 
(MCQ; Johnson et al., 1988). 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 67 participants took part in the study.  Of those, 20 claimed to have seen the film, 25 
reported that they had not seen the film and were asked to imagine seeing it.  A further 22 
participants were not asked about the film but simply about when they first heard the news of 
the car crash.  Thus, of the 45 participants who were directly asked whether they had seen 
the non-existent film, 20 (44%) indicated that they had.  The mean age of participants was 
30.6 years (SD = 11.9 yrs) and the range was from 17 years to 72 years.  Twenty three (34%) 
of the participants were male and 44 (66%) were female.  The means and standard deviations 
of the background characteristics are given in Table 1. 
 
---insert table 1 about here--- 
 
Procedure 
 
The study was conducted in the local shopping centre, near to the University, and the sample 
consisted of members of the public.  The experimenters (one male and two female) excluded 
potential participants if they indicated that they were students at the University of Portsmouth.  
Shoppers were approached and asked whether they would participate in a University of 
Portsmouth study examining how well individuals could remember tragic events.  Potential 
participants were informed of the ethical guidelines constraining the research, were informed 
of their right to withdraw from the study at any time, and were debriefed when they had 
completed all the questionnaires. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
participants who claimed to have seen the film of the plane crash in Crombag et al.’s study (55%).  Based on these 
results, the film of the car crash was therefore chosen to serve as the target event for the main study. 
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The first 45 participants were initially asked to respond to the question “Have you seen the 
papparrazi’s video-recording of the car crash in which Diana, princess of Wales and Dodi 
Fayed lost their lives?”  Participants who claimed to have seen the film were asked to 
complete the MCQ in reference to their ‘memory’ for having seen the film of the car crash.  
Participants who reported that they had not seen the film were asked to ‘imagine’ what the 
film would have looked like and then complete the MCQ accordingly. The experimenters 
continued approaching potential participants until a total of 20 participants had indicated that 
they had seen the film of the crash.  As a result, there are slightly more participants (i.e. 25) 
who were asked to imagine having seen the film. 
 
A further 22 participants were not asked about the film of the car crash but instead were 
asked “Do you remember where you were when you heard the news about the death of 
Diana, Princess of Wales?”.  These participants were then asked to complete the MCQ in 
reference to their memory of when they first heard or saw the news of the car crash.  The aim 
here was to provide a baseline measure on the MCQ for an event that participants would 
have experienced.  After completing the MCQ all participants were asked to complete the 
individual differences measures, the order of presentation of which was counterbalanced for 
all three groups. 
 
Results 
 
Correlations between background variables 
 
---insert table 2 about here--- 
 
The correlations between the background variables were calculated using Kendall’s tau, for 
two reasons: to test for monotonic, rather than specifically linear relationships between the 
variables, and to provide a coefficient for those associations involving gender (a dichotomous 
variable) comparable to the others (Meddis, 1984).  As shown in Table 2, there were several 
noteworthy correlations between variables across the whole sample.  Responses to the 
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dissociative experiences scale were positively correlated with responses to the self monitoring 
scale, and negatively correlated with age and the memory confidence score.  Thus, 
participants who scored higher on the dissociative experiences scale, also scored higher on 
self monitoring, were younger, and rated their memory as poorer.  Higher scores on the self 
monitoring scale were associated with younger, male participants. 
 
Comparisons across sample - groups and sex 
 
Due to the relatively small sample size in the present study it was not possible to perform an 
analysis that included all 38 items of the MCQ individually.  Furthermore, the small sample 
size precluded the use of a technique such as Principal Components Analysis with which a 
new set of subscales could have been constructed.  Instead the statistical analysis was 
performed using the subscales identified by McGinnis and Roberts (1996) and these are 
detailed below.  
 
Subscales of the MCQ employed by McGinnis and Roberts (1996) 
 
1. Clarity. MCQ items related to memory clarity and vividness (Questions 1, 3, 8, 9, 33) 
2. Sensory components. MCQ items related to memory for touch, sound, taste, and smell (Questions 4-7) 
3. Contextual attributes. MCQ items related to memory for setting and spatial arrangement (Questions 13-16) 
4. Time. MCQ items related to memory for time, date, year, and season (Questions 17-21) 
5. Valence. MCQ items related to the magnitude of positive or negative tone or feelings (Questions 23 & 28) 
6. Thoughts and feelings. MCQ items related to the emotional components of memories and the implications of 
the remembered experience (Questions 25-27, 29, 31, 32) 
7. Events before and after. MCQ items related to memory for events that preceded and followed that specific 
memory (Questions 34 & 35) 
8. Frequency of consideration. MCQ items related to how frequently a participant had thought about or talked 
about that specific memory (Questions 37 & 38) 
 
A MANOVA was conducted on the mean scores of the eight subscales, with the subgroup 
and sex as the independent variables.  Box’s M test was not found to be significant therefore 
homogeneity of covariance was assumed (Box’s M = 225.70, F (108,3306) = .702, p=.991).  
At the multivariate level, significant main effects of subgroup (Roy’ Largest Root = .377, F 
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(8,55) = 2.59, p = .018) and sex (Roy’s Largest Root = .424, F (8,54) = 2.86, p = .010) were 
found2.  There were no interaction effects (Roy’s Largest Root = .116, F (8,55) = .80, p = .60).  
At the univariate level the sensory subscale differed as a function of the groups of participants 
(F (2,61) = 3.51, p = .036).  Scheffé post hoc contrasts indicated that participants who were 
asked to rate their memory of when they first heard the news of the crash gave significantly 
higher scores (p = .025) on the sensory subscale (M = 9.20, SD = 0.74) when compared to 
participants who were asked to imagine having seen the film (M = 6.41, SD = 0.80).  The 
clarity subscale achieved marginal significance (F (2,64) = 2.82, p = .067) and a comparison 
of the mean scores indicated that the same trend existed.  Participants who were asked to 
rate their memory of when they first heard the news of the crash gave higher scores on the 
clarity subscale (M = 26.72, SD = 1.58) than participants who were asked to imagine having 
seen the film (M = 21.36, SD = 1.70).  Thus the first hypothesis, that the participants in the 
control subgroup would give higher ratings for sensory information than participants in the 
imagine subgroup or the claim-to-have-seen subgroup, received only limited support as only 
one of the eight subscales differed significantly between two of the three groups.  
Furthermore, the MCQ scores of participants in the claim to have seen group did not differ 
significantly from MCQ scores of participants in the control group. 
 
At the univariate level there was a main effect of sex on two of the MCQ subscales, sensory 
(F (1,61) = 7.157, p = .010) and thought and feelings (F (1,61) = 7.035, p = .010).  Inspection 
of the mean scores indicated that female participants gave higher scores on the sensory 
subscale (M = 8.8, SD = 0.53) than male participants (M = 6.39, SD = 0.73).  Female 
participants also gave higher scores on the thoughts and feelings subscale (M = 31.3, SD = 
1.08) than male participants (M = 26.39. SD = 1.49). 
 
Comparisons among groups - background characteristics 
 
In order to investigate whether there were differences in background characteristics between 
the groups, independent t-tests were conducted on the individual differences measures 
                                                          
2
 Differences between the three groups reached the .05 level using Roy’s Largest Root (p=.018) but not using Wilk’s 
Lambda (p=.193).  However, since the purpose of this study was exploratory, the less stringent analysis (i.e. Roy’s 
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(excluding sex) with the groups (excluding the control group3) as the independent variable.  
Analysis of these data revealed that, as predicted, Self Monitoring scores were significantly 
higher in the claimed to have seen subgroup than in the imagine subgroup, partially 
supporting the second hypothesis (see Table 3).  However, there were no systematic 
differences between the two groups on any of the other measures (including the DES).  In 
order to investigate sex differences between the groups, a Chi2 analysis was conducted, 
which did not reveal a significant effect.  
 
---insert table 3 about here--- 
 
Discussion 
 
The most striking finding of the present study was that a substantial number of participants 
were willing to report that they had seen a non-existent film of the car crash.  This is an 
important replication of Crombag et al.'s findings.  With regards to the experimental 
hypotheses, however, the results are less clear. 
 
Analysis of the MCQ ratings given by participants who were asked to imagine the film and 
participants asked to rate their memory of when they first heard the news of the crash (control 
subgroup) supported the reality monitoring model.  Participants who rated their memory of 
when they first heard the news of the crash gave consistently higher mean scores on the 
sensory subscale than participants who were asked to imagine seeing the film.  However, this 
study provides limited support for the first hypothesis that the MCQ may be a useful tool in 
distinguishing 'true' and 'false' memories as the MCQ ratings of the claim to have seen 
subgroup were not significantly different from the MCQ ratings of the imagine, or the control 
subgroup.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Largest Root) was followed. 
3
 The control subgroup was excluded from this analysis because it was not possible to know whether, if asked, these 
participants would have claimed to have seen the film or not.  The only psychologically meaningful comparison was 
therefore between those individuals who had, and had not, claimed to have seen the film. 
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This may be due partly to the nature of the target event that was used.  The target event used 
in the present study was something that participants claimed (or did not claim) to have seen 
on television.  As a result perhaps the only differences that might be expected would be in 
terms of visual and auditory components of the experience.  Furthermore, the small sample 
size precluded the use of a principal components analysis (or similar technique) that might 
have yielded groupings of MCQ items that were more appropriate to base the MANOVA on.  
The subscales constructed by McGinnis and Roberts (1996) were derived from participants' 
MCQ ratings of autobiographical events and therefore may not have been as valid when 
applied to ratings of televised events.  Further research is needed to examine MCQ ratings of 
'true', 'false', and 'imagined' autobiographical target events (see Porter et al., 1999).   
 
The analysis revealed that female participants gave consistently higher ratings on certain 
subscales of the MCQ than did male participants.  This suggests that further research is 
needed to establish whether such sex differences in responses to the MCQ are stable.  
Indeed there is a body of literature that suggests that female participants experience richer 
imagery than male participants (e.g. Paivio & Clark, 1991).  If so, then these would need to be 
taken into account in future application of the MCQ profiles. 
 
Interestingly, however, participants in the claim to have seen subgroup did provide 
significantly higher scores on the Self Monitoring scale than participants in the imagine 
subgroup.  This finding supports the suggestion made by Crombag et al. (1996) that 
compliance may be a key factor in explaining why so many people claimed to have seen the 
film of the plane crash in Amsterdam.  Further research is needed to examine the role of 
compliance in other studies of 'false' memory.  Perhaps surprisingly, there were no systematic 
differences on the DES between participants who did, or did not, claim to have seen the film.  
These findings are inconsistent with the recent literature that reports significant associations 
between 'suggestibility' and dissociative experiences (Porter et al., 1999; Hyman & Billings, 
1998; Ost et al., 1997).  However, the present study may have more ecological validity in that 
the ‘event’ was probably highly emotive for all participants. 
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Conclusion and future studies 
 
The results of the present study gave only limited support the hypothesis that the MCQ may 
be a useful tool in distinguishing between 'true' and 'false' memories.  Although there were no 
interaction effects in the data, there was an effect of sex on the MCQ scores that warrants 
further investigation.  The present study did not confirm recent research that reports 
significant associations between scores on the DES and the tendency to report events that 
did not occur.  In fact, in the present study, an eagerness to please the experimenter 
(expressed as higher scores on the Self Monitoring scale) appeared to be related to claiming 
to have seen the non-existent film of the car crash.  
 
Despite the findings of the present study, these results indicate that further research into the 
utility of the MCQ in distinguishing different types of memory is necessary.  Specifically, is the 
pattern of results similar when personally relevant events are used as target events?  If the 
MCQ is to be applied to the issue of contested claims of childhood trauma, more research will 
be needed regarding the MCQ profiles of memories of sexual abuse (e.g. Ward & Carroll, 
1997).  Perhaps most interestingly of all, the findings of the present study suggest that more 
research is needed to clarify the possible effects of compliance, or eagerness to appear to be 
"good subjects", on false memory reports that are produced in the laboratory. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and ranges for background characteristics. 
N=67 Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
Self monitoring 9.4 3.5 2 17 
Memory confidence score 22.5 5.5 10 34 
Age 30.6 11.9 17 72 
Dissociative experiences scale 38.5 14.4 13.9 72.5 
 
Table 2. Correlations between DES, memory confidence, self monitoring and age. 
 Dissociative 
experiences 
scale 
Memory 
confidence  
Self monitoring Age  
 
Gender 
 
Dissociative 
experiences 
scale 
 -.20 *     .26 **   -.26 ** -.08 
Memory 
confidence 
 
  -.05 .00  .00 
Self monitoring 
 
 
    -.18 *     -.45 *** 
Age 
 
 
    .18 
 
Key: * denotes significance at p<.05 level, ** denotes significance at p<.01 level, *** denotes significance at p<.001 
level. 
 
Table 3. Mean background characteristics scores by subgroup (excluding control). 
 “Seen” film n=20 “Imagine” film n=25 Significance 
Age (years) 28.7 32.8 t(43) = -1. 35 n.s. 
DES 39.9 35.5 t(43) = 0. 98 n.s. 
Self-monitoring 10.4 8.3 t(42) = 1. 89 * 
Memory confidence 23.7 21.6 t(43) = 1. 21 n.s. 
% of females in group 27.3 43.2 Chi2
  
= 1. 89 n.s. 
Note: n.s. denotes no significant effect, * denotes p<.05 (1-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
